Social Identity, Indexicality, and the Appropriation of Slurs by Katherine Ritchie
155
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XVII, No. 50, 2017
Social Identity, Indexicality, 
and the Appropriation of Slurs
KATHERINE RITCHIE
City College of New York, CUNY, New York, USA
Slurs are expressions that can be used to demean and dehumanize tar-
gets based on their membership in racial, ethnic, religious, gender, or 
sexual orientation groups. Almost all treatments of slurs posit that they 
have derogatory content of some sort. Such views—which I call content-
based—must explain why in cases of appropriation slurs fail to express 
their standard derogatory contents. A popular strategy is to take ap-
propriated slurs to be ambiguous; they have both a derogatory content 
and a positive appropriated content. However, if appropriated slurs are 
ambiguous, why can only members in the target group use them to ex-
press a non-offensive/positive meaning? Here, I develop and motivate an 
answer that could be adopted by any content-based theorist. I argue that 
appropriated contents of slurs include a plural fi rst-person pronoun. I 
show how the semantics of pronouns like ‘we’ can be put to use to explain 
why only some can use a slur to express its appropriated content. More-
over, I argue that the picture I develop is motivated by the process of 
appropriation and helps to explain how it achieves its aims of promoting 
group solidarity and positive group identity.
Keywords: Slurs, appropriation, reclamation, indexicals, social 
groups.
Slurs are expressions that can be used to demean and dehumanize tar-
gets based on their membership in social groups based on, e.g., race, 
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ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual orientation.1 Recently there has 
been increased interest in the semantics and pragmatics of slurs in phi-
losophy of language and linguistics. While accounts vary signifi cantly, 
almost all theorists agree that slurs have derogatory content of some 
sort or other.2 Various theories have been developed to address how 
derogatory, demeaning, or other negative content is encoded and ex-
pressed. For instance it has been argued to be part of truth conditional 
content, presuppositional content, expressive content, and convention-
ally implicated content. I’ll call all of these views and their variants 
content-based views.
On content-based views while slurs generally express something de-
rogatory, there are cases of (re)appropriation or reclamation in which 
groups that are targeted by a slur reclaim it for positive in-group us-
age.3 Content-based theorists often argue that appropriation involves 
meaning change, in particular, it involves an expression becoming 
ambiguous. On this view, slurs that are not appropriated have uni-
vocal derogatory contents while appropriated slurs are ambiguous (or 
polysemous) between a derogatory and a non-derogatory content.4 For 
example, Richard says that “there is a case to be made that in appro-
1 Mentioning and of course using a slur can cause offense and other serious 
harms. The practice of mentioning slurs rather than using phrases like ‘the N-word’ 
or ‘b----’ is standard practice in the philosophical and linguistics literature on slurs 
and pejoratives. Camp argues in support of explicit mentions of slurs stating that 
“we can understand slurs’ actual force only by considering examples where we 
ourselves experience their viscerally palpable effects” (2013: 331). Bolinger argues 
that the choice to mention a slur may be “associated with tamer (though not 
benign) attitudes, ranging from simple insensitivity to perverse pleasure at saying 
discomfi ting words, and disregard for the risk of encouraging derogating uses of the 
slur” (2017: 452). I take good academic writing to require clarity and I hold that it 
should be sensitive to various readers’ experiences, encourage inclusiveness, and 
avoid derogation. In an attempt to meet both I will minimize mentions of slur. I 
will also mention only one slur—‘bitch’. I do so to provide a more concrete account 
with specifi c linguistic data, while avoiding (what might be perceived as) gratuitous 
mentions of multiple slurs. I use ‘bitch’ because it is an expression that is widely held 
to be in the process of appropriation and its use by individuals outside the target 
groups is less offensive than some other examples of appropriated slurs. I hope by 
limiting the number of slurs mentioned, offense and other harms can be minimized 
and clarity can be maintained.
2 Although see Anderson and Lepore (2013a, 2013b), Bolinger (2017), and 
Nunberg (forthcoming) for views on which the derogatory features of slurs are based 
on non-semantic prohibitions, on term and negative stereotype endorsement, and on 
conversational implicatures, respectively.
3 The term ‘appropriation’ is most commonly used to denote this phenomenon. 
While I think ‘reclamation’ is slightly better (partly due to the negative associations 
‘appropriation’ has from discussions of cultural appropriation), I will follow standard 
usage and use ‘appropriation’ from here.
4 There are, of course, other options for handling appropriation. For instance 
see Anderson (forthcoming), Bianchi (2014), and Lycan (2015). I am not arguing 
that positing an ambiguity is the best route to handle appropriation. It is, however, 
a common route and one with an apparent problem that I offer a solution to here.
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priation there [is] a change in meaning” (2008: 16). Potts claims that 
“when lesbian and gay activists use the word ‘queer’, its meaning (and 
its expressive content) differs dramatically from when it is used on con-
servative talk radio” (2007: 10). Jeshion suggests that ““queer” became 
semantically ambiguous upon appropriation” (2013: 326). Hom states 
that appropriation “alters [a slur’s] meaning for use with the group” 
(2008: 428). Whiting argues that in appropriation “the expressions bear 
a different meaning than they would otherwise bear, at least insofar 
as (once appropriated) they no longer conventionally implicate the rel-
evant negative attitude” (2013: 370). And Saka ties meaning change 
into the very defi nition of appropriation. He states that appropriation 
is when a “victim group attempts to change the meaning of some term” 
(2008: 42). The strategy of positing ambiguity to account for appropria-
tion is clearly widespread.
While positing ambiguity5 is a natural move for a proponent of 
content-based view of slurs, a problem looms. The theorist positing 
multiple meanings needs to explain why at least in many cases of ap-
propriation one of the meanings the term comes to have can only be 
expressed by the term when it is used by members of the targeted 
group. For instance, not just any speaker can use the N-word or ‘bitch’ 
to mean something friendly or positive. Other ambiguous and poly-
semous expressions do not place restrictions on who can use them to 
express one or the other of their contents. For instance, anyone can 
use ‘duck’ to denote an aquatic bird or a crouching action. Anyone can 
use ‘bank’ to mean fi nancial institution or side of a river. Anderson 
and Lepore pose the problem stating “[a]mbiguity fails to explain why 
non-members cannot utilize a second sense. If it were just a matter of 
distinct meanings, why can’t a speaker opt to use a slur non-offensive-
ly?” (2013a: 42). The worry they target is what I call the Appropriation 
Worry.
Appropriation Worry: Content-based views that posit an ambiguity 
to account for appropriation cannot account for why only members 
in the target group (and perhaps others with “insider” status) can 
use an appropriated slur to express a non-offensive/positive mean-
ing.
Later Anderson states that “at the very least, [an ambiguity view] must 
be paired with an additional explanation, one that details some kind 
of rule-like structure that governs access to the appropriated sense” 
5 From here I use ‘ambiguity’ to mean ‘ambiguity or polysemy’. One way of 
understanding the difference between ambiguity and polysemy is as follows: 
ambiguity involves separate words that are orthographically or phonologically 
identical. Polysemy involves a single word with multiple meanings. The ways “classic” 
ambiguous expressions—like ‘bank’—and examples of polysemous expressions—like 
‘bottle’—pattern on Zwicky and Sadock’s (1975) identity tests give some evidence 
that ambiguity and polysemy are distinct phenomena. For additional discussion and 
treatments of polysemy see, for example, Falkum and Vicentea (2015).
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(forthcoming, 6). That is the task I take up here. I develop a solution to 
the Appropriation Worry that could be adopted by any content-based 
theorist. The Appropriation Worry does not spell defeat for content-
based views that posit ambiguity. I argue for a solution to the Appro-
priation Worry on which appropriated slurs are ambiguous between a 
derogatory content and an appropriated content that involves a plural 
fi rst-person indexical. I show how the semantics of plural fi rst-person 
indexicals can be put to use in the solution and account for why only 
target group members (and perhaps also those with “insider status”) 
can use appropriated slurs to express their positive contents. I also ar-
gue that the solution is motivated by the process of appropriation and 
that it helps to explain how appropriation achieves its aims of promot-
ing group solidarity and positive group identity.
I begin in 1 by laying out the range of content-based views. Then, 
in 2, I consider the process and aims of appropriation. I also canvass 
data that a solution to the Appropriation Worry must capture and ex-
plain. In 3 I consider the ways that indexicals can be sensitive to a 
speaker’s position in physical and social space. In particular, I argue 
that a speaker’s social group memberships can constrain or determine 
the content of her uses of plural fi rst-person indexicals. In 4, I sketch 
a version of an ambiguity account that includes a fi rst-person plural 
pronoun in the appropriated content. I illustrate the account by con-
sidering the case of ‘bitch’. I argue that the account is well motivated 
and can solve the Appropriation Worry. In 5, I briefl y compare the view 
developed to other treatments of slurs involving indexicality. I summa-
rize the arguments and draw conclusions in 6.
Before continuing, three clarifi cations are in order. First, I am not 
arguing that slurs must be accounted for by a content-based view or 
that ambiguity should be posited to account for appropriation. That 
is, my aim here is not to defend content-based views or the ambiguity 
solution to appropriation. Rather, I am arguing that the Appropriation 
Worry can be solved. It is not a reason to reject either content-based 
theories or an ambiguity view of appropriation.
Second, recall that the Appropriation Worry requires a content-
based theorist to account for why only members in the target group can 
use an appropriated slur to express a non-offensive/positive content. 
The only cases of appropriation the worry targets are those in which 
an appropriated expression has both its original derogatory meaning 
and a new (likely) positive meaning. The ultimate aim of at least some 
cases of appropriation is plausibly to completely obliterate the deroga-
tory meaning of a slur and supplant it was a positive or neutral mean-
ing.6 Some former slurs, e.g., ‘tar heel’ and ‘Whig’, are arguably no lon-
ger derogatory and can be used by any speaker to express something 
6 In some cases of appropriation , the aim might be to reclaim a slur solely for 
in-group usage. I do not claim that the only aim in appropriation is to supplant 
derogatory meaning with a new positive or neutral meaning. Thanks to Robin 
Jeshion (pc) for emphasizing that appropriation projects might have different aims. 
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non-derogatory. The expression ‘queer’ plausibly has an appropriated 
meaning that is expressible by anyone tokening it (including people 
who are cis-gender and heterosexual). There are now Queer Studies 
departments and the LGBTQ movement has included ‘queer’ in its ac-
ronym, which can be appropriately used by any speaker.7 Given that 
my aim is to provide a way for a content-based theorist to avoid the 
Appropriation Worry cases in which a new meaning has supplanted an 
old will not be considered. Here I focus only on expressions that are of-
ten treated as having two meanings—one positive meaning expressible 
by the appropriated slur only by in-group members and one negative 
meaning expressible by the slur by any users.
Third, there is ongoing disagreement about whether appropriation 
can lead to positive effects and, so, whether appropriation should be at-
tempted. Some (e.g., Asim 2007 and Kleinman et. al. 2009) argue that 
so-called appropriated uses express self-hatred and reinforce racism, 
heteronormativity, and patriarchy. For instance, Asim argues that “[a]
s long as we [Blacks] embrace the derogatory language that has long 
accompanied and abetted our systematic dehumanization, we shackle 
ourselves to those corrupt white delusions” (2007: 233). In contrast, 
Kennedy argues that “[s]elf-hatred … is an implausible explanation for 
why many assertive, politically progressive African Americans” use the 
N-word, rather they “in their minds at least” use the expression “not in 
subjection to racial subordination but in defi ance of it” (2003: 37). There 
are complicated social, political, and moral issues surrounding appro-
priation that cannot be addressed here.8 If appropriation is impossible, 
there is no Appropriation Worry to solve. Given the widespread view 
that appropriation does occur and given the aim to provide a solution 
to the Appropriation Worry here I adopt the following assumptions: (i) 
appropriation is possible and (ii) appropriation can produce lexicalized 
contents that are positive rather than derogatory.
1. Content-Based Views of Slurs
I categorize any view that takes slurs to include a derogatory compo-
nent in their conventional lexical meaning to be a content-based view. 
The derogatory component could be a conventional part of truth-con-
ditional meaning, an additional non-truth-conditional expressive con-
tent, a presupposition, or a conventional implicature. Since each of 
7 Although ‘Q’ is also sometimes taken to stand for ‘questioning’. Thanks to 
Matthias Jenny for bringing this point to my attention.
8 For instance, see also Langton, Haslanger, and Anderson (2012) and Wodak 
and Leslie (forthcoming) for worries that generic generalizations about racial 
groups essentialize (or can easily be interpreted as essentializing). One component 
of social justice projects involves showing that there are not innate racial essences 
that manifest in intellectual, moral, and personality traits. If a slur, even used to 
express its positive appropriated meaning, is used in a generic generalization their 
worries about essentializing apply. See Tirrell (1999) for discussion of arguments for 
abolishing versus reclaiming slurs.
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these four views takes slurs themselves to conventionally express (in 
some way) a derogatory content, I classify all as content-based views. 
There are, of course, other ways to classify views. For instance one 
might argue that presuppositional and conventional implicature views 
are pragmatic, while only views on which slurs have derogatory truth-
conditional content should be considered “content views”.9 Given that 
(a) the views just listed all include something derogatory in the lexical-
ized content of slurs, and (b) the Appropriation Worry is a worry for 
any view that take slurs to conventionally express (in some way or 
other) a derogatory content and posits ambiguity to account for ap-
propriation, this classifi cation schema will be useful for our purposes. 
I will sometimes use the expressions ‘semantic’ and ‘meaning’. I intend 
these expressions to be understood in ways that are neutral between 
the various content-based views to be discussed. In particular, in their 
uses here I do not take ‘semantic’ or ‘meaning’ to require more than 
conventional lexical content. Next, I briefl y lay out versions of the four 
content-based views.
First, are what I call truth-conditional content views (e.g., Hom 
2008, 2010 and Hom and May 2013). On these views a slur for a group 
of people that can also be referred to by a neutral counterpart N means 
something like N* and worthy of contempt for being so. Hom argues 
that multiple stereotypes are part of the truth conditions of utterances 
that include slurs. On his view, a slur S with neutral counterpart N 
has a complex truth-conditional semantic value of the form ‘ought to 
be subject to p*1+….+p*n because of being d*1+…d*n all because of be-
ing N*’ (Hom 2008: 431). The properties p*1+….+p*n are deontic pre-
scriptions about how the person should be treated given the negative 
properties derived from racist (or sexist, or homophobic, or …) practices 
given by d*1+…d*n and N* is the semantic value of N. For instance, 
he states that “the epithet ‘chink’ expresses a complex, socially con-
structed property like: ought to be subject to higher college admissions 
standards, and ought to be subject to exclusion from advancement to 
managerial positions, and …, because of being slanty-eyed, and devi-
ous, and good-at-laundering, and…, all because of being Chinese” (Hom 
2008: 431). On truth-conditional content views, the meaning of a slur 
and its neutral counterpart are not truth-conditionally equivalent as 
the latter includes a (perhaps complex) derogatory component.
The remaining three classes of views take slurs to be truth-condi-
tionally equivalent to their neutral counterparts, but take the expres-
9 For instance Sennett and Copp (2015) classify only views like what I call the 
truth-conditional content views to be content views. Bianchi (2014) takes strategies 
that rely on conventional implicatures or presuppositions to be pragmatic, seemingly 
going against classifying the four strategies I take to be content-views together. 
However, she notes that the “(semantic or pragmatic) status” of conventional 
implicature and presuppositional views “is far from settled” noting that Potts (2007) 
and Camp (2013) classify their views as semantic. Hom (2010) argues for a six way 
classifi cation.
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sions to have another dimension of meaning that captures its offensive 
and derogatory content. According to presuppositional content views 
(e.g., Schlenker 2007 and Cepollaro 2015), slurs contribute only their 
neutral counterparts to truth conditions and they presuppose some-
thing derogatory. The derogatory component is lexicalized or “built 
into” the meaning of the slur so that all utterances of slurs carry a neg-
ative presupposition.10 According to presuppositional accounts slurs 
are akin to expressions like quit. Utterances of “Andy quit smoking” 
and “Andy did not quit smoking” both presuppose that at a time pre-
ceding the time of utterance Andy smoked. Similarly, presuppositional 
content views hold that “Anne is a bitch” and “Anne is not a bitch” both 
presuppose something like Anne is despicable for being a woman or the 
speaker believes people who are women are worthy of derogation.
Conventional implicature content views (e.g., Potts 2005, William-
son 2009, Whiting 2013, Lycan 2015) hold that slurs contribute the 
equivalent of their neutral counterpart to the truth conditions (e.g., the 
equivalent semantic content that ‘Black’, ‘gay’, ‘Jewish’, or ‘woman’ ex-
press), and conventionally implicate something negative. The notion of 
conventional implicature goes back to Grice (1975). He argued that ex-
pressions like ‘but’ carry implicatures that are not calculated based on 
a specifi c conversational context and conversational maxims. Instead, 
they are lexically conventionalized. For instance, “Nwando is poor but 
honest” truth-conditionally expresses the same content as “Nwando is 
poor and honest” but conventionally implicates that it is unusual to 
be both poor and honest. The implicature is not dependent on specifi c 
contextual or conversational features, but is part of the import of the 
word ‘but’ itself (albeit not a part of its truth-conditional content).11 
Applied to slurs conventional implicature content views hold that slurs 
conventionally implicate something derogatory. For example, William-
son (2009) argues that “A is a Boche” means that A is a German and 
conventionally implicates that A is cruel.
Finally, expressivist content views (e.g., Saka 2007, Richard 2008, 
Jeshion 2013) hold that the truth-conditional contribution of a slur is 
identical to its neutral counterpart, but an additional expressive ele-
ment or content is also conveyed. For example, Jeshion argues that in 
addition to their truth-conditional content, slurs have an expressive 
component that expresses “contempt for members of a socially relevant 
10 There are multiple views of the way presuppositions work. Most take 
presuppositions to be at least partly semantic in nature. There are, however, 
purely pragmatic accounts of presupposition (see, e.g., Stalnaker 1974). On such 
views presuppositions are understood wholly in terms of conversational contexts. 
The views that take the derogatory content of slurs to be presuppositional take 
the presuppositions to be carried by the lexical item (i.e., the slur itself) so would 
be classifi ed as (at least partially) semantic accounts of slurs. They can, therefore, 
legitimately be categorized as content-based views.
11 While ‘but’ is a classic example used in discussions of conventional implicature, 
not all agree that it involves conventional implicature (see, e.g., Potts 2005).
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group on account of their being in that group or having a group-defi n-
ing property” (Jeshion 2013: 316).12
The preceding discussion evidences that many theorists hold con-
tent-based views of slurs. Each of these theories needs to be paired 
with an account of appropriation. As we saw above many theorists pos-
it ambiguity to account for appropriation. In such cases, they also need 
a response to the Appropriation Worry. Next, I turn to data about the 
process and results of appropriation.
2. Appropriation Data 
In ordinary cases, one speaker using an extant word in a non-standard 
way does not alter its meaning. It is only through multiple uses of the 
word in what was a non-standard way that a word’s meaning can change 
or that a word can come to have an additional meaning. Appropriation 
is a process that takes time, multiple uses, and multiple speakers.13 
Cases of appropriation involve a slur being taken up by members of the 
group the slur targets for positive in-group usage—thereby undermin-
ing the derogatory content of the slur.14 In this section I consider what 
is required for appropriation. Then, I turn to several data points that 
must be captured, and ideally explained, by any adequate treatment of 
appropriation.
Appropriation is social and political. It works to emphasize and con-
struct group identity and to promote group solidarity. Tilly argues that 
“social movements stand out for their emphasis on identity assertion” 
and highlight that individuals with the identity are “worthy, unifi ed, 
numerous, and committed” (Tilly 2002: 121). The famous slogan from 
12 Jeshion includes a third component in her semantics of slurs as well—what 
she calls an identifying component. She states that “as a matter of their semantics” 
slurs “are used so as to signal that being [for example] Jewish, Chinese, [B]lack, gay, 
a prostitute identify what its targets are” (Jeshion 2013: 318, emphasis original).
13 There might be exceptions to this. For instance, someone with a lot of authority 
might be able to appropriate a term with a single widely heard utterance. For 
instance, Robin Jeshion (pc) suggested that Obama using ‘Obamacare’ in a positive 
way might have been enough for it to be appropriated. In a tweet on March 23, 2012 
Obama said “Happy birthday to Obamacare: two years in, the Affordable Care Act 
is making millions of Americans’ lives better every day.” While Obama’s tweet likely 
played a large part in the appropriation effort—a campaign involving emails from 
top White House offi cials, a website, and a hashtag were also created to help reclaim 
the term. So, it is not clear that even when an utterer has authority and a large 
audience that a single use is enough to reclaim a derogatory expression.
14 At least usually it is in-group usage that results in appropriation. Beaton 
and Washington (2015) discuss a case of ‘favelado’ a slur in Brazilian Portuguese 
referring to individuals who live in slums, that has been appropriated in the context 
only of fans of the soccer team Flamengo. The term was used by opposing teams 
to derogate Flamengo fans and is now used within the group of Flamengo fans as 
a term of solidarity. Since Flamengo fans were taken by opposing team fans to be 
referents of ‘favelado’ I take the example to be very similar to appropriation by in-
group members.
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the activist group Queer Nation—“We’re here! We’re Queer! Get used to 
it!”—is a prime example. In the chant a slur is appropriated as a means 
of self-identifi cation and it is demanded that being queer be normalized 
and respected. Croom states that a sense of solidarity can be fostered 
by in-group uses of a slur and that this “can help speakers signal to 
each other that they are not alone and that others like them share in 
their pains, perspectives, and history of prejudices” (Croom 2011: 350). 
Hom argues that target group use of a slur can serve as “a means of 
in-group demarcation to bring members of the targeted group closer 
together” (Hom 2008: 428). By self-labeling as Ns members of a target 
group emphasize their identity as oppressed people and reinforce that 
there is a shared position from which political demands can be made. 
In appropriating a slur for self-identifi cation, members in the target 
group might do more than emphasize their shared history; they can 
also construct identities involving in-group norms about ways to act, 
dress, communicate, and so on.15 Appropriation is part of a project that 
emphasizes that these are strengths of ours; this is how we dress, talk, 
and act; we have persevered. Rahman states that since the N-word is “a 
self-selected term for naming members of the group, it is an apt subject 
for yielding insight into the way that at least some African Americans 
see themselves and their community” (Rahman 2012: 139). She goes 
on to say that, at least in some cases, its use contributes to a person’s 
“presentation of self within the community” (2012: 140). Appropriation 
of a slur can emphasize and construct identity and promote solidarity. 
These are key features of identity politics and social justice movements.
In addition to identity-building and solidarity-promoting, appro-
priation works to remedy power imbalances and remove weapons 
from oppressors. Hornsby states that old derogatory meanings are not 
“brushed away: they are subverted” (Hornsby 2001: 134). This is po-
litical action. In appropriation oppressed people rise up to confi scate a 
linguistic tool that functions to reinforce oppressive social structures. 
Appropriation involves pointing out oppressive social and cultural 
norms and working to counteract them. McConnell-Ginet argues that 
“to use queer both to affi rm difference from heterosexual norms and to 
refuse efforts to eliminate or reduce such differences is to claim a kind 
of ‘mastery’, to refuse the conjunction of abuse and attribution of homo-
sexuality so prominent in the … history of the word queer” (McConnell-
Ginet 2011: 254). The slur being appropriated is altered to reject the 
combination of negativity with social group identity. Kennedy argues 
that in reclaiming slurs marginalized groups “have thrown the slur 
right back in their oppressors’ faces” (Kennedy 2003: 38). Finally, Hom 
(2008) argues that appropriation involves taking back a powerful tool 
of discrimination in an effort to remove the offensive power of a slur. 
Each of these theorists stresses that appropriation is an action that 
15 I thank Rachel McKinney for stressing the point the appropriation does not 
just express, but constructs identity.
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aims at reconfi guring power imbalances by laying claim on a tool of the 
oppressors.
A recent study provides evidence that slur appropriation can have 
measurable effects at least on perceived power imbalances. Galinsky, 
et al (2013) found that self-labeling with a slur increases an individu-
al’s sense of power and increases an observer’s evaluation of both the 
self-labeler’s power and the power of the target group. Moreover, they 
found that self-labeling led to decreased perceptions of negativity in 
the slur that was used to self-label. To summarize, appropriation is a 
process that is social and political in at least the following four ways: (i) 
it emphasizes and constructs group identity (ii) it promotes solidarity 
(iii) it works to remedy power imbalances, and (iv) it takes tools from 
oppressors.
Bianchi (2014) argues that appropriation is not always social or 
political. She argues that while appropriation can occur in social and 
political contexts it can also occur in what she calls “friendship con-
texts” when one is joking amongst friends. Even in the context of a joke, 
I argue that appropriation is social and political. Slurs are part of a 
social-historical context of oppression and power imbalance. Even if ap-
propriation begins as a part of a joke, it always relies on socio-political 
features of slurring expressions. So, it is always social and political.
To see why, consider pejoratives like ‘asshole’, ‘dick’, or ‘jackass’. 
These expressions are frequently used in the context of jokes. If joking 
around using a term was suffi cient for appropriation, these expressions 
would plausibly have appropriated positive meanings. Yet, it is clear 
that they do not. For instance, even though ‘asshole’ is often used ironi-
cally or in a joking manner, it has not gained a new positive meaning. 
If appropriation is always tied to the social and political as a part of a 
process to undermine oppressive structures and stereotypes, we can 
make sense of this data. Expressions like ‘asshole’ do not target groups 
of people that are socially oppressed. They are pejorative, but not in 
the same way that slurs are. Words like ‘jerk’ are not, as Tirrell states, 
“tied to a rich structure of other social practices” in the way that slurs 
are (Tirrell 1999: 62). Even when target group members use a slur as a 
joke, their use is social and political given the way slurs are tied to so-
cial practices, stereotypes, and power imbalances. Joking is not enough 
to appropriate pejoratives that are not tied to socio-political structures. 
This evidences that appropriation is social and political. Slurs’ social 
and political nature makes them ripe for appropriation while other 
non-group denoting general pejoratives are not.16 Next, I turn to exam-
ining linguistic data about appropriated slur use.
Individuals outside a racial, ethnic, gender, sexual-orientation, or 
other group targeted by a slur cannot use an appropriated slur to ex-
16 This is not to say, of course, that other pejoratives are not subject to changes in 
their meanings. Meaning changes can occur in any expressions, but not all changes of 
meaning are cases of appropriation. Thanks to David Plunkett for useful discussion 
that led me to consider pejoratives that do not target groups.
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press its appropriated meaning. Or, at least, those outside the target 
group can use a slur to express its appropriated meaning only in very 
rare circumstances. For instance, someone might gain “insider” status 
in a target group that allows her or him to use the slur to express its 
appropriated content. Kennedy argues that there are relationships be-
tween a black person and a white person that are such that “the white 
person should properly feel authorized, at least within the confi nes of 
that relationship, to use the N-word” (Kennedy 2003: 42). This gives us 
our fi rst datum—and one half of the Appropriation Worry.
Outsider Usage: For an appropriated slur S which targets group 
g, individuals outside of g cannot (or perhaps very rarely with “in-
sider” status) use S to express its appropriated content.
Our second datum is that individuals in the target group are able to 
use appropriated slurs to express their appropriated content. This and 
Outsider Usage are the data that the Appropriation Worry trades on. 
It should also be noted that it is possible for a member of the targeted 
group to use an appropriated slur to express its original derogatory 
meaning. For instance, a woman can use ‘bitch’ to express an unap-
propriated negative content. Being in the target group does not force 
someone to use a slur to express its appropriated positive content.17 We 
can formulate this data as:
Insider Usage: Members of group g targeted by an appropriated slur 
S can use S to express its appropriated content or its original dero-
gatory content.
Next, I turn to developing a semantics of appropriated slurs that cap-
tures Outsider and Insider Usage, solves the Appropriation Worry, and 
which takes seriously the features and aims of appropriation discussed 
above.
3. Indexicals and Social Identities 
We are physically located in space and time. We are also socially lo-
cated in a “space” of social groups. We are members of unions, depart-
ments, boards, and clubs. We are in social kinds—like the kinds New 
Yorkers, Canadians, philosophers, immigrants, women, and Latinos. 
In order to solve the Appropriation Worry, I argue that one’s position in 
social space—that is what groups one is a member of—can affect what 
one can express with certain expressions.
Indexicals are expressions whose contents vary from context to con-
text depending on, for instance, a speaker’s location in space and time. 
In this section I argue that fi rst-person plural indexicals are sensitive 
to social position. That is to say, they are sensitive to what social groups 
17 Anderson (forthcoming) also argues that appropriated slurs can be used to by 
target group members to express something negative, although he argues that with 
negative in-group uses of the N-word the attitude expressed is different from that 
expressed by bigots’ uses of the N-word.
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a speaker is in. I argue that fi rst-person plural indexicals’ sensitivity 
to position in social space places restrictions on what a speaker can use 
‘we’ and ‘us’ to denote.
The section proceeds as follows. I begin by considering familiar cases 
in which a speaker’s physical location determines what is expressed by 
(or restricts what she can express by) indexical expressions like ‘here’ 
and ‘now’. Then I consider cases of pronouns with gender features. Fi-
nally I consider cases of singular and plural fi rst-person pronouns. I 
will rely on the view that a speaker’s position in physical and social 
space can restrict or determine what she can mean by an indexical in 
my solution to the Appropriation Worry.
As is well known, a speaker’s position in space and time can de-
termine or constrain the content of her uses of indexical expressions 
like ‘here’ and ‘now’. According to Kaplan (1989) indexicals are directly 
referential expressions with both a character and a content. Characters 
are meaning rules that can be modeled by functions from contexts to 
contents. Contexts are parts of the world that can be modeled as or-
dered tuples including at least the speaker, addressee(s), time, and lo-
cation. Contents are objects (e.g., places or people). Let’s work through 
an example. The character of ‘here’ can be modeled by a function from 
contexts (modeled as ordered tuples) to the location in the ordered tu-
ple. A token of ‘here’ uttered in a context in which New York City is the 
contextually specifi ed location has NYC—that object—as its content. 
The character is used to deliver a content, but is not part of what is 
expressed. ‘Here’ directly refers to a place on each occasion of use. Simi-
larly, according to Kaplan an utterance of ‘now’ directly refers to the 
time of the utterance (the time in the context), not, say a time 10 days 
later or 3 years earlier.18 Even if one rejects a direct reference theory 
of indexicals, any account of expressions like ‘here’ and ‘now’ must ac-
count for the way the utterance context determines what is meant (or 
constrains what a speaker can intend) on an occasion of use.
These familiar examples show that what an expression can be used 
to express can depend on a speaker’s location in space-time. They do 
not, however, appear to be sensitive to any specifi c features of the 
speaker. For instance, anyone in New York City can use ‘here’ to refer 
to it. The sort of sensitivity appropriated slurs manifest is more spe-
cifi c. Whether a slur can be used to express its appropriated content 
does not vary with movement through physical space, rather it is the 
speaker’s social group memberships—whether he is a man, Black, het-
erosexual—that matters. We need evidence to show that expressions 
can be sensitive to social group membership in order to have the re-
18 There are issues with the boundaries of locations in the case of ‘here’ and ‘now’. 
For instance, is the contextual location the room in which an utterance is made? 
The city? State? Country? There are also issues with recordings, like an answering 
machine, that might require a more complicated treatment. See Kaplan (1989) for 
an initial presentation of the case. See Cohen and Michaelson (2013) for a range of 
possible responses to cases like these.
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sources to solve the Appropriation Worry. I argue that gender features 
provide some evidence for social position sensitivity.
Gender features on expressions often require that their denotations 
have a particular gender. For instance, the gender features on the Eng-
lish pronouns ‘she’ and ‘he’ almost always restrict their denotations to 
feminine and masculine entities, respectively.19 Gender features can 
affect interpretation and felicity. Consider the following examples:
1. Laura met Chris at noon. She likes him.
2. Laura met Chris at noon. He likes her.
3. Laura walked into the house. ??He saw that the lights had been 
left on.
The gender features on the pronouns in 1 and 2 deliver different in-
terpretations about who likes whom. In a null context 3 might be in-
terpreted as infelicitous given the masculine feature of ‘he’ and that 
‘Laura’ is stereotypically a name for a woman. Alternatively, it might 
provide the information that Laura identifi es as a man.20 Gender fea-
tures on pronouns can be sensitive to a denotation’s gender and can 
affect interpretation.
It has been argued since at least de Beauvoir (1949/2011) that gen-
der is social. De Beauvoir famously argued that “[o]ne is not born, but 
rather becomes, woman” (1949/2011: 330). Numerous accounts of gen-
der as a social feature have been proposed. All share at their core the 
claim that gender is not wholly natural. Gender does not, for example, 
depend solely on physiological features like chromosomes or reproduc-
tive organs. Haslanger argues that “[g]ender categories are defi ned in 
terms of how one is socially positioned, where this is a function of, e.g., 
how one is viewed, how one is treated, and how one’s life is structured 
socially, legally, and economically” (2000: 38). Butler (1990) argues 
for a performative conception of gender on which gender is performed 
through repeated actions (e.g., wearing lipstick and crossing one’s legs 
when seated). For our purposes, a specifi c account of the social nature 
of gender is not required. Given that it is overwhelmingly held that 
gender is social, I will adopt that view here. We will see below several 
examples that show ways gender, and so, something social, infl uences 
what one can express by some particular expression.
So far I have argued that (i) gender features on pronouns restrict 
interpretation and affect felicity and (ii) that gender is social. Given (i) 
and (ii) it follows that some expressions are sensitive to social features. 
This data does not yet show that what a speaker can express with an 
19 Of course, grammatical gender systems do not always require a denotation to 
be gendered in a particular way. That is, grammatical gender is not always aligned 
with semantic or what is sometimes called “natural” gender. Ships are not literally 
women, although they are often referred to with tokens of ‘she’. Gardens do not have 
a gender, but in Spanish ‘el jardín’ is masculine. However, some grammatical gender 
clearly affects interpretation and felicity. 
20 Thanks to Nicole Dular for offering this alternative judgment.
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expression is constrained by her social position. For instance, men, 
women, and people who are gender-non-conforming can all use ‘she’ 
to denote a woman. Gender features of third-person pronouns do not 
restrict who can use an expression to express some particular content, 
but rather restrict whom the expression can denote. We have evidence 
that a speaker’s physical location in space-time can affect what she can 
express with a certain linguistic item. We have evidence that a social 
feature, namely gender, can affect interpretation and felicity. We do 
not yet, however, have evidence that what content a speaker can ex-
press with a certain expression is sensitive to her social features. Next 
I offer two arguments to show that social features can affect what a 
speaker can express with certain expressions. The fi rst involves fi rst-
person gender marked Japanese pronouns. The second focuses on uses 
of fi rst-person English indexicals.
Japanese includes fi rst-person pronouns that are gender specifi c 
and that vary in degrees of femininity/masculinity and formality. The 
felicity of a pronoun depends on certain features of the speaker and 
the context (e.g., the relationship between the speaker and addressee). 
Even though pronouns have specifi c gender features, there is variation 
in the pronouns speakers use to refer to themselves. In a longitudinal 
study of middle-school children, Miyazaki (2004) found that popular-
ity affected which pronoun a child used. For instance, she found that 
popular boys used the masculine pronoun ‘ore’ while unpopular boys 
used ‘boku’. One unpopular boy said that he “wouldn’t sound cool at all 
if [he] used ore” (reported by Miyazaki 2004: 256). She also reports that 
unpopular boys who try to use ‘ore’ are often bullied or beat up. Girls 
who use ‘ore’ are reportedly taken to be rebellious or “crazy”, while boys 
who use feminine fi rst-person pronouns are reported to be homosexual 
or transgender. Miyazaki’s data supports the view that a speaker’s 
gender, identity and social status affect pronoun choice and interpreta-
tion. We now have preliminary evidence that what a speaker’s social 
position affects what she can express by some expressions.
English data, particularly involving fi rst-person plural pronouns, 
provides additional evidence that what one can express with a pronoun 
depends on one’s social position. ‘We’ can have uses that are sensitive 
to a speaker’s role or group memberships. For instance, consider the 
following:
4. [Said by a woman] We are less likely to contract the disease than 
men are.
4’. Women are less likely to contract the disease than men are.
5. [Said by a child of civil rights activists] If my parents hadn’t been 
born, we would be even worse off than we are now.
5’. If my parents hadn’t been born, Black people would be even 
worse off than Black people are now.
Nunberg (1993) offers example 4 and argues that it is equivalent to 
4’. If a man were to utter 4 it could not be synonymous with 4’. What 
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a speaker can express with ‘we’ is constrained by the group(s) the 
speaker is actually in. Suppose 5 is uttered by a child of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and Coretta Scott King. That speaker might use 5 to express 
5’. In contrast, someone white could not use 5 to express 5’. Again, a 
speaker’s group memberships can restrict what she can express by an 
utterance of ‘we’.
Examples 4-5 include adverbs of quantifi cation (‘likely’) and modals, 
but ‘we’ can denote a group that is not individuated merely in terms of 
extension in other contexts as well. For instance, consider the following:
6. [Said by a Muslim Congressperson] We are rare.
7. [Said by a woman] We get paid less than men for doing the same work.
8. [Said by a Transwoman] We are being murdered without prosecu-
tion or protection by hate crime laws.
9. [Said by someone Black] So many forces in American life are tell-
ing us that our lives don’t matter, that our lives are expendable, 
that when we are killed when we’re unarmed that we can’t get jus-
tice for that.21
The tokens of ‘we’ in 6–9 are naturally interpreted as synonymous 
with ‘Muslim Congresspeople’, ‘women’, ‘transwomen’, and ‘Blacks’, 
respectively. In these cases, ‘we’ is used to refer in ways that are strik-
ingly similar to bare plural expressions in generic generalizations. The 
predicate in 6 (‘rare’) has been classifi ed as a direct-kind predicate. 
Direct-kind predicates are overwhelmingly held to take kinds, rather 
than individuals members of a kind, as arguments.22 For instance, 
while no person is rare, Muslim congresspeople and other social or 
natural kinds can be rare. Sentences 7-9 are examples of characteriz-
ing generics. Characterizing generics specify some characteristic that 
is common or striking although perhaps not universal in the group. 
For instance, 7 could be true even if some women are not paid less 
than any men for doing the same work. The speakers of 8 and 9 have 
not been killed. Nevertheless, 8 and 9 could be (and, unfortunately, 
are) true.23
The fi rst-person pronouns in 6-9 are not being used to denote some 
purely extensionally defi ned set of individuals. Rather, they are used to 
denote social groups that share some feature(s). These examples show 
that an overt adverb of quantifi cation or modal is not required to de-
liver an interpretation of a plural fi rst-person indexical that is sensi-
tive to a property.
Examples 4-9 show that ‘we’ can be used to refer to a group that is 
not just a set, sum, or plurality of members, but a group that is speci-
21 Quote from John Legend, April 26, 2015 CNN State of the Union.
22 See, e.g., Krifka, et. al. (1995) and Leslie and Lerner (2016).
23 There is widespread debate about the correct semantics for generic 
generalizations. See, e.g., Carlson (1977), Krifka, et. al. (1995), and Leslie and 
Lerner (2016).
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fi ed in terms of some property (or properties). ‘We’ does not straightfor-
wardly fi t into a Kaplanian direct reference theory of indexicals. One 
can be a member of many groups. One is in a member of groups based 
on race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, and religion. One is 
a member of a family, cliques, teams, clubs, and departments. In a 
conversation one is a member of a group of speakers and interlocutors. 
There is not just one group that any speaker’s use of ‘we’ can denote. In 
modeling contexts in the way Kaplan does, there is not one element in 
the tuple that is the group that contains the speaker. Moreover, there 
cannot even be one group that is the contextually salient group that 
contains the speaker. For example, in a single context the speaker 
might use ‘we’ to pick out her immediate family, the group containing 
herself and her interlocutor, and the group of all Americans. ‘We’ can-
not be a pure indexical in the sense Kaplan argued ‘I’ was. Speaker in-
tentions, broader conversational goals, and other features are required 
to fi x the denotation of ‘we’.
Moreover, uses of ‘we’ are often not rigid in the way Kaplan argues 
uses of indexicals are. For instance, recall 6, repeated below:
6. [Said by a child of civil rights activists] If my parents hadn’t been 
born, we would be even worse off than we are now.
If one holds that a person’s origins are essential, the speaker of 6 will 
not exist in the worlds at which 6 is evaluated. Further, 6 might be true 
and denote a group at those worlds. ‘We’ is not rigid, or is not straight-
forwardly rigid in the way ‘I’ has been argued to be.24
Consider one more case to emphasize the point.
10. We might have been liberals.
Nunberg (1993) imagines 10 uttered by a Supreme Court justice in 
the context of a discussion of what the make up of the Supreme Court 
might have been given different results in some salient presidential 
elections. He argues that in that context 10 need not mean that the ac-
tual Supreme Court justices might have been liberals, but rather that 
the justices who would have been appointed would have been liberals. 
Again, the denotation of ‘we’ is allowed to vary across worlds in a way 
that, at least prima facie, is at odds with rigidity. The data canvassed 
provides evidence that what a speaker can express by ‘we’ is restricted 
by her actual roles and memberships in various groups.
Tokens of ‘we’ denote groups. Some groups are specifi ed in terms of 
properties, like being women, rather than merely in terms of having 
24 One could argue that ‘we’ rigidly picks out a group that can vary in members 
across times and worlds. Even if this is the case, it is rigid in a way that is much 
less straightforward than ‘I’. Moreover, to avoid making rigidity trivial, the account 
of rigidity that allows for group variation must not entail that all terms are rigid. 
For instance, it should not entail that, e.g., ‘the tallest people’ rigidly picks out a 
group that varies across times and worlds. See Devitt (2005) and Besson (2010) for 
discussion of rigidity and natural kind terms that could inform the viability and 
structure of an account of rigidity for ‘we’.
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particular individuals as members. The data in 4–10 shows ‘we’ can 
denote a group that is not just specifi ed in terms of extension. The se-
mantics of ‘we’ can be sensitive to properties.25
4. Solving the Appropriation Worry with Plural Indexicals
Recall that according to many content-based views, upon appropria-
tion a slur becomes ambiguous. The Appropriation Worry argued that 
positing ambiguity failed to account for who could use a slur to express 
its positive appropriated content. We now have the resources to give a 
solution to the Appropriation Worry. In sketching the solution, I will 
use ‘bitch’ as a case study. ‘Bitch’ and ‘bitches’ are plausibly forms of a 
slur that has an appropriated meaning and that retains its original de-
rogatory meaning. My aim here is to argue for a solution to the Appro-
priation Worry that provides the resources to supplement any version 
of a content-based view of slurs. While the specifi cs of content-based 
views vary, all take slurs to express something derogatory through 
either truth-conditional content, presupposed content, a conventional 
implicature, or an additional expressive content. Here, I will present 
the solution within the framework of a conventional implicature con-
tent-based view. I do so not because I intend to defend a conventional 
implicature view (or any other content-based view). Rather, I do so in 
order to represent the solution to the Appropriation Worry more explic-
itly while avoiding gratuitous repetition. The view I offer is available 
to any proponent of a content-based view with suitable adjustments.
While my aim is not to argue for any precise defi nitions of slurs or 
appropriated contents, nevertheless, it will be useful to consider fairly 
explicit examples for the slur under consideration. The specifi cs could 
be adapted to, for instance, include specifi c stereotypes or other fea-
tures.26 Consider a sentence containing ‘bitch’ that is ambiguous be-
25 Nunberg (1993) argues against Kaplan’s direct reference theory of indexicals 
using data like 5 and the following: [Said by a condemned prisoner] I am traditionally 
allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.
He takes the sentence to express something like “an inmate on death row is 
traditionally allowed to order whatever he likes for his last mean”. Nunberg calls 
these “descriptive uses” of indexicals. Moreover, he argues that they must be 
captured semantically. So, the direct reference theory of indexicals is false. There 
is widespread dispute about whether Nunberg’s view that there are descriptive 
elements in the semantics of indexicals is correct. See, e.g., Nunberg (1993) and 
Elbourne (2008) for arguments in favor of semantic accounts of “descriptive uses”. 
See, e.g., Recanati (1993), King (2006), and Hunter (2010) for arguments against 
semantic accounts of “descriptive uses”. Whichever way one sides in the debate 
about other indexicals my arguments against ‘we’ being a pure indexical and against 
a simple story about the rigidity of ‘we’ provide evidence that its semantics is not 
accommodated by a Kaplanian direct reference theory.
26 On the view I sketch here, I take the original content of ‘bitch’ to be non-
indexical and its appropriated content be a plural fi rst-person indexical. I should 
note, however, that one could take both meanings to be indexical. Perhaps the original 
content emphasizes that women are other by including ‘they’, while the appropriated 
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tween expressing a slur’s original derogatory content and its appropri-
ated positive content:
11. I’m going out with my bitches tonight.
On the view under consideration, 11 has two possible interpretations 
as in 11’ and 11’’ (where ‘TC’ stands for truth-conditional content and 
‘CI’ stands for conventionally implicated content):
11’. TC: I’m going out with my women tonight.
  CI: They are despicable or lesser than for being women.
11’’. TC: I’m going out with my women tonight.
  CI: We women are laudable for being women.27
The original content is a simple truth-conditional content on which 
‘bitch’ truly applies to someone if the person is a woman. It conven-
tionally implicates that the subject is despicable or lesser. In the ap-
propriated content, the neutral element, ‘woman’, is retained and the 
conventional implicature is subverted, implicating that we are worthy 
for being women. 11’ could be expressed by anyone uttering 11. In con-
trast, the Appropriation Worry traded on the fact that 11’’ can only be 
expressed by utterances of 11 by certain speakers. That is, not just any-
one who utters 11 can express 11’’. To express the appropriated mean-
ing, a speaker must be part of the targeted group—in this case the 
group of women. The indexical in 11’’ captures why only some speakers 
can express the appropriated meaning of ‘bitches’ by uttering 11. To see 
how the account will go, we need to examine the semantics of ‘we’. Be-
fore doing so, I want to justify the use of a plural fi rst-person pronoun.
The use of the plural fi rst-person is motivated by the process and 
aims of appropriation. In Section 2 I argued that appropriation is a 
social and political action that reinforces solidarity and constructs and 
emphasizes group identity. ‘We’ emphasizes that there is a group that 
is a subject rather than merely a group shaped and created by oppres-
sors. As de Beauvoir argued in using ‘we’ proletarians and Black peo-
ple emphasize that they are subjects and “transform the bourgeois or 
whites into ‘others’” (1949/2011: 28). The use of ‘we’ in these cases em-
phasizes solidarity. Further, since ‘we’ is being used to denote a group 
with members beyond the immediate conversational context the pro-
fessed solidarity goes beyond the participants in the utterance context.
Relying on a plural, rather than singular, fi rst-person pronoun is 
also motivated by the following observation. It is possible for a speaker 
meaning emphasizes us and includes ‘we’. Again, my aim is not to argue for some 
very specifi c entries, but to argue that appropriation involves indexicality. Thanks to 
John Kulvicki for pressing me to think more about this issue. Miščević also considers 
whether there is an us/them element involved with pejoratives (2016: 138-139).
27 These are possible contents for a proponent of a conventional implicature view. 
If one prefers one of the other content-based views, one could take the CIs to be part 
of the truth-conditions, presuppositions, or expressive content of ‘bitch’. Minimal 
adaptations of the account allow the strategy I advocate to be adopted any of the 
content-based views.
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who uses a appropriated meaning not to think of herself as particu-
larly laudable. That is, it possible for someone who is a woman, Black, 
homosexual, or in some other group targeted by a slur to use an ap-
propriated slur to express something positive about the group while 
also questioning their own strengths or worth. For instance, a woman 
who currently evaluates her creative outputs, job performance, body, or 
other features negatively, might still use ‘bitches’ to express something 
positive about women. For instance, suppose that instead of the appro-
priated content of 11 being 11’’ it was 11’’’:
11’’’. TC: I’m going out with my women tonight.
   CI: I am laudable for being a woman.
If the conventional implicature (or truth conditions, or presupposition, 
or expressive content) required that the speaker believe of herself that 
she is laudable, it would be infelicitous or contradictory for a speaker 
to express a negative self image while using ‘bitch’ to express its ap-
propriated content. Yet, in appropriation an individual member of a 
targeted group need not think of herself as especially laudable, even 
while expressing that a group of which she is a member is deserving 
and admirable. The account I offer, which relies on ‘we’ in the appropri-
ated content of a slur can allow for this combination of attitudes. To see 
why consider the following case.
In a certain context, 12 could express a true generalization about 
women, but one which does not apply to the speaker.
12. [Said by a woman] We get paid less than men, although I am 
  the highest paid person at my fi rm.
12 is felicitous and easy to interpret. The truth of generic generaliza-
tions, like in 12, does not require that every member of a kind sat-
isfy the predicate. This provides evidence that in certain cases the 
speaker herself might be excepted from the extension of the predicate 
that takes the denotation of ‘we’ as argument. Although a full story is 
needed, it is in principle possible for a speaker to think that she is not 
laudable, while saying that we women are laudable. Next I argue that 
Outsider Usage and Insider Usage can be captured by the proposal be-
ing sketched. To fi ll out the account, we need to look more carefully at 
the semantics of ‘we’.
Pronouns, including ‘we’, are often taken to carry presuppositions 
that place requirements on their satisfi ers. Heim and Kratzer (1998) 
argue that number, gender, and person features are presuppositional. 
For instance, for a token of ‘she’ to receive an interpretation, there must 
be a possible denotation that meets the constraint of being a woman/
girl (i.e., satisfying that property).28 Otherwise, it is standardly argued 
28 Recall above the claim that gender is social rather than biological. If gender 
requires being female the distinction between sex and gender is dissolved. In their 
analysis, Heim and Kratzer require that the property being female be met by any 
possible denotations of ‘she’ or other feminine pronouns. To account for gender 
identities that do not match biological sex, here I take the property that must be met 
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that the token does not receive an interpretation and the entire sen-
tence is neither true nor false.
A use of ‘we’ denotes a group that the speaker is actually a member 
of. ‘We’ is not the mere plural of ‘I’. It does not denote a group of speak-
ers speaking in unison. Rather, as Wechsler puts it ‘we’ denotes “the 
speaker plus associates” (2010: 377). The solution to the Appropria-
tion Worry I offer here requires that the following additional presup-
positions are adopted. First, it requires that tokens of ‘we’ presuppose 
that the speaker/writer is a member of a salient (or intended) group g. 
Second, following Heim (1982) on descriptive content presuppositions, 
when ‘we’ occurs in phrases of the form ‘we Fs’, it carries a presupposi-
tion that the members of the group, g, be Fs.29 If a presupposition is 
not satisfi ed the utterance is infelicitous. If the presupposition(s) are 
met, ‘we’ denotes or refers to the group g. These provide the necessary 
resources for a solution to the Appropriation Worry.
In the last section I argued that ‘we’ always denotes a group, that 
some groups are specifi ed in terms of properties, and so ‘we’ sometimes 
denotes a group that is intensionally specifi ed. I argued that the ev-
idence in 4-10 supports this conclusion. Moreover, the evidence was 
used to argue that what one can express by an expression can be sen-
sitive to the features of a speaker. I should note, however, that the 
solution to the Appropriation Worry I offer here could be adopted with 
weaker commitments. The conventional implicature I offered in 11’’ 
includes the noun phrase ‘we women’ rather than simply ‘we’. By using 
‘we women’ a descriptive content presupposition can be appealed to, 
thereby avoiding taking a stance on whether the semantics of ‘we’ is 
intensional.30 
In 11’’, ‘we women’ triggers both presuppositions. The group denot-
ed by ‘we’ must meet the condition of being composed of women and the 
speaker must be a member of the group. So, the speaker must herself 
be a women for 11’’ to be felicitous. If a man were to utter 11 attempting 
to express 11’’ it would be infelicitous. Given the presupposition failure 
in his attempting to express 11’’ one might hold that either that he 
actually expressed 11’ or, at least, that he would plausibly be interpret-
ed as expressing 11’. The semantics of ‘we women’ explains why only 
members of the target group can felicitously use slurs to express their 
appropriated contents and helps to explain why utterances of slurs by 
outsiders, even those who are attempting to use slur to express some-
thing positive, are taken to be derogatory or defective.
by a possible denotation of ‘she’ to be is a woman or girl. Whether my modifi cation 
will allow for non-human animals to be eligible denotations of gendered pronouns 
will depend on whether non-human animals are boys or girls (they are presumably 
not men or women).
29 There might be an additional presupposition that g is the the largest group 
that meets the condition. I am not aiming to give anything like a full theory of ‘we’ 
here, so leaving out additional presuppositions is not a fault of the discussion.
30 Thanks to Matthias Jenny for useful discussion about this point.
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The force of the Appropriation Worry has been diffused by the ac-
count I have offered. Recall the usage data discussed in Section 2.
Outsider Usage: For an appropriated slur S which targets group 
g, individuals outside of g cannot (or perhaps very rarely with “in-
sider” status) use S to express its appropriated content.
Insider Usage: Members of group g targeted by an appropriated slur 
S can use S to express its appropriated content or its original dero-
gatory content.
Outsider Usage, sans the parenthetical, has been captured by the ac-
count offered. The fi rst disjunct of Insider Usage has also been cap-
tured. Let’s consider strategies to capture the remaining portions of 
the usage data.
First consider the possibility that a member of a targeted group can 
use a slur with its original derogatory content. Here we do not need 
an independent explanation of how ambiguous expressions are disam-
biguated. Whatever strategy for disambiguation more generally turns 
out to be best can be adopted here. For instance, the strategy that best 
accounts for why an utterance of “I went to the bank” expresses one 
rather than the other meaning of ‘bank’ can be used to explain why a 
target group member’s token of a slur has its original or appropriated 
meaning. Presumably the story will include something about speaker 
intentions, features of an utterance (e.g., the speaker’s tone), features 
of the conversational context (e.g., relationship between participants, 
topic of conversation), or other factors. The account I have developed 
does not force any speaker to use a slur to express its appropriated 
content.
Next, consider the apparent possibility that in some rare cases a 
speaker who is not a member of the target group, but who has “in-
sider” status of some sort can use a slur to express its appropriated 
content. The account I have offered could be supplemented semanti-
cally or pragmatically to handle such cases. First, one might hold that 
insider status in a context allows a speaker to count as satisfying the 
presupposition that he is a member of the group targeted by the slur. 
So, at least for the purposes of certain exchanges, the speaker counts as 
a member of the targeted group. On this view, someone can be a woman 
(or member of another targeted group) in one context even if they are 
not in some other context. To develop this strategy a contextually de-
pendent variable could be added to the predicate ‘woman’ to deliver 
different extensions in different contexts.
Alternatively, one could argue for a pragmatic account of the ap-
parent ability of insiders to use slurs to express their positive mean-
ings. On such an account the speaker is not really able to express the 
appropriated meaning with his utterance of a slur, but his utterance is 
not taken to be offensive given his insider status. On this alternative 
while the speaker literally slurs the target group—given that it was 
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appropriated for usage only by members of targeted groups—it is clear 
to all addressees that no offense was intended and that the speaker 
meant to convey solidarity.31 Either a semantic or pragmatic strategy 
is open to a proponent of a content-based view adopting the solution to 
the Appropriation Worry I argued for here.
Appropriation involves members in the target group working to-
gether to subvert the derogatory element of a slur. When appropriation 
is successful, speakers in the target group can use the slur to express 
something positive which conveys group solidarity. The account I have 
argued for captures Outsider Usage and Insider Usage, while fi tting 
with the general aims and process of social and political movements 
to reclaim slurs. Next I briefl y consider other accounts of slurs that 
involve indexicality and show how my account differs.
5. Other Accounts of Slurs with Indexical Elements
Other theorists have proposed that slurs have an indexical element. 
Here I briefl y discuss three views that involve indexicals and show how 
they differ from the view for which I have argued.
Schlenker (2007) proposes that slurs and other expressives carry 
presuppositions that are indexical and attitudinal.32 For instance, he 
takes ‘honky’ to carry the presupposition that the speaker (i.e., agent) 
of the context of utterance believes that whites are despicable (in the 
world of the context). The presupposition is indexical and attitudinal 
as it requires the speaker in the context to have a particular attitude. 
There are several differences between the account I have sketched 
and Schlenker’s. First, he focuses on un-appropriated uses of slurs, 
while I focus on appropriated uses. Second, he take the indexical to be 
singular rather than plural. I argued above that a plural fi rst-person 
pronoun better accounts for the Appropriation Worry while being mo-
tivated by the general aims of appropriation as solidarity building and 
group demarcating.
31 There is an apparent tension between adopting a semantic ambiguity strategy 
to handle appropriation when target-group members use appropriated slurs and 
a pragmatic strategy to account for “insider” status usage of appropriated slurs. 
One might argue that if appropriation by a target group is to be accounted for 
semantically (as content-based theorists for whom the Appropriation Worry is a 
problem hold) then “insider” status usage should be accounted for semantically as 
well. I do not take the apparent tension to be decisive. There are after all differences 
between being friends with women or people racialized as Black and actually being 
a woman or actually being racialized as Black that could be appealed to in order to 
motivate a semantic ambiguity strategy on the one hand and a pragmatic strategy 
on the other. However, the tension might speak in favor of a semantic treatment of 
“insider” status usage. Thanks to Daniel Wodak and Matthias Jenny for pressing 
this issue.
32 He also argues that the presupposition can be shiftable, building off Schlenker 
(2003) which argues that indexicals are shiftable (i.e., that indexicals can be 
monstrous). I won’t focus on this element of the view.
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Thommen gives a brief sketch of a view on which slurs are indexi-
cals. He argues that a slur can only be used in a context in which “the 
speech participants (the speaker and the hearers) share a certain nega-
tive response” to the target group (Thommen 2014: 43). Thommen’s 
view broadens the indexical element of a slur, by taking more than the 
speaker to be relevant. In doing so, however, he seems to rule out the 
possibility of a slur being uttered and expressing a derogatory content 
when some conversational participants do not have negative attitudes 
towards the target group. For instance, suppose that three people are 
having a conversation. If two harbor racist attitudes towards Black peo-
ple and one does not, Thommen’s view appears to make a derogatory 
utterance of a slur against Blacks impossible. I take it that this gets the 
facts wrong. Moreover, Thommen does not explicitly give a semantics 
for slurs. So it is not clear whether he wants to include the indexical 
‘we’ or whether he wants to have separate elements that are sensitive 
to the speaker and hearer(s). In addition, Thommen is focused on un-
appropriated uses of slurs. He does not aim to address appropriation. 
Finally, Kennedy argues that the meaning of a slur can vary “de-
pending upon, among other variables, intonation, the location of the 
interaction, and the relationship between the speaker and those to 
whom he is speaking” (Kennedy 2003: 43). Kennedy does not argue 
for a detailed theory of how a slur’s meaning varies, so it is diffi cult to 
tell exactly how indexicality is meant to be built into the content of a 
slur. From the factors listed it sounds like either (a) he takes slurs to 
have radically indexical contents or that (b) he is including the varied 
pragmatic effects as parts of a slurs meaning. I am inclined to inter-
pret him as taking the meaning of a slur to include its broad linguistic 
import—including both conventional lexicalized effects and pragmatic 
conversational effects. It is certainly right that a slur might have wide-
ly varied pragmatic effects depending on, say, whether it was uttered 
at a basketball game, in a courtroom, or at the United State Holocaust 
Memorial museum. It is much more controversial, however, whether 
all these effects should be included in a lexicalized conventional ac-
count of the content of a slur. While indexical elements play a role in 
other treatments of slurs, no one has focused on indexicality as a way to 
solve the Appropriation Worry and no one has drawn on the semantics 
of ‘we’ as I have done here.
6. Conclusion
Almost all theorists agree that slurs have derogatory content. We saw 
that a worry arises for proponents of any content-based approach. If 
slurs have derogatory content, it is natural to conclude that they gain 
an additional content when they are appropriated. Yet, the new con-
tent can only be expressed by appropriated slurs uttered by members of 
the target group. The Appropriation Worry stated that content-based 
views that posit an ambiguity to account for appropriation cannot ac-
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count for why only members in the target group can use a appropri-
ated slur to express a non-offensive/positive meaning. To defl ate the 
Appropriation Worry I have argued that the lexical entries for appro-
priated slurs include a plural fi rst-person indexical. I argued that ‘we’ 
is sensitive to one’s social position—in particular it is sensitive to the 
speaker’s social group memberships. In general ‘we’ requires that the 
speaker actually be a member of the group picked out. The requirement 
holds regardless of whether the group denoted is just the plurality of 
the speaker and addressee or a larger group that involves the shar-
ing of gender, racial, ethnic, sexual orientation, occupational, or other 
features. By considering the aims and purpose of appropriation, social 
positions, and the way linguistic content can be sensitive to positions in 
social space, the Appropriation Worry can be solved.
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